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Abstract Based on a unique data set of 909 defaulted retail and commercial (self-
employed and SMEs) credit customers in Germany, whose original loans were made
by 123 different banks, our article confirms a significant positive influence of col-
lateral, and of amicable agreements between the debtor and the bank (redemption),
on the recovery rate [1 - loss given default (LGD)]. In a further analysis of
collateral, systematic biases between the realized market price and the expected
market values of real estate are revealed, even though the appraisal reports should
have already considered all factors influencing the value. Using valuations that were
adjusted for these recognized biases, we can increase the explanatory power of the
underlying models. Moreover, we compare these models to models that apply, as is
common practice in the banking industry, flat haircuts to collateral values and show
the superior performance of our proposed approach.
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1 Executive summary
Our study investigates the recovery rate [1 - loss given default (LGD)] of bank
loans, a key parameter in the context of Basel II, for retail and commercial (self-
employed and SMEs) customers in Germany. The recovery rate relates the proceeds
and costs of realization to the outstanding amount at the time of default [exposure at
default (EAD)]. It is included in the calculation of expected and unexpected losses
in the credit portfolio and thereby influences the calculation of the value at risk
(VaR) as well as (future) credit terms.
Based on a unique data set of 909 defaulted customers in Germany, whose loans
were originally made by 123 different banks, our study shows that the collater-
alization of a loan is the major driver of the recovery rate for retail and commercial
customers in Germany; this confirms earlier research on recovery rates. We also find
that an amicable agreement between the debtor and the bank (redemption) has a
significant positive influence on the recovery rate. Furthermore, we find systematic
biases between the realized and the expected values of collateral in real estate, even
though the appraisal reports should have already considered all factors influencing
this value. Adjusting the collateralization values for these recognized systematic
biases significantly improves the explanatory power of our model for recovery rates.
We compare our model to models applying flat haircuts to the collateral values, a
fairly common practice in the banking industry. Our study demonstrates that
collateral values should not be taken as given. In particular, systematic biases may
influence estimated LGDs, and should be corrected by appropriate adjustments.
While the results may hold for a greater universe, they are particularly relevant for
savings banks and cooperative banks because of the focus of these banks on the
customer segment analyzed here.
2 Introduction
The probability of default (PD) and the recovery rate [1 - loss given default (LGD)]
are the key parameters for risk-adjusted pricing of loans in the context of Basel II.
The recovery rate relates the proceeds and costs from realization to the outstanding
amount at the time of default [exposure at default (EAD)]. For internal risk
management purposes, the recovery rate, the PD, the EAD, and their correlations are
included in the calculation of expected and unexpected losses of the credit portfolio,
and thereby influence the calculation of the value at risk (VaR) as well as (future)
credit terms. Therefore, a bank’s internal risk management has to develop a model
that allows an accurate estimate of the recovery rate. A precise estimate, on one
hand, can generate a competitive advantage and, on the other, can reduce problems
arising from adverse selection due to small differences in loan spreads (e.g., Gu¨rtler
and Hibbeln 2013). Moreover, banks that prove to have appropriate internal models
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for predicting the recovery rate are allowed to use advanced internal rating based
(IRB) approaches. These approaches can result in reduced capital requirements.
Hence, a detailed estimate of the recovery rate is beneficial from a regulatory
perspective as well.1
While several prior studies analyze recovery rates for corporate bonds (e.g.,
Altman 1989; Renault and Scaillet 2004; Altman et al. 2005), the body of literature
concerning bank loan recovery rates has been growing rapidly in recent years. The
better data availability means that a large proportion of the literature examines the
corporate sector (e.g., Franks et al. 2004; Grunert and Weber 2009). Literature on
the recovery rate for retail customers and SMEs is also growing steadily. Our work
contributes to this strand of literature in multiple ways.
First, we fill a gap in recovery rate research in Germany. While a few German
studies analyze corporate customers (e.g., Grunert 2005; Grunert and Volk 2008;
Grunert and Weber 2009; Franks et al. 2004), only one study so far (Gu¨rtler and
Hibbeln 2013) has analyzed a sample of loans to retail and commercial customers.
However, the focus of Gu¨rtler and Hibbeln (2013) lies in the field of consumer
loans, with an average EAD of EUR 9665 in their sample. Although the German
banking system is, in terms of total assets, among the largest in the world, a study of
SME loans, as well as a study of larger retail loans (not consumer loans), is missing
so far. Our study is also linked to the body of literature on the recovery rate of real
estate loans (see, e.g., Calem and LaCour-Little 2004; Qi and Yang 2009; Leow and
Mues 2012; Tong et al. 2013; Park and Bang 2014). A study for Germany that
predominantly analyzes real estate loans is also missing so far. Loans to retail
customers and SMEs are of particularly high importance in Germany, since more
than 50 % of the total loan volume is granted to this specific customer group
(Deutsche Bundesbank 2014). Our results confirm the intuitive expectation of a
positive influence of collateral on the recovery rate for retail and commercial
customers. A major fraction of the variance of the recovery rates is explained by our
models, which is mainly caused by the fact that collateral in real estate (the
predominant collateral in our data set) usually carries a high fundamental value.
Furthermore, our results demonstrate that in 40 % of the cases an amicable
agreement (redemption) between the bank and the debtor can be found. A positive
influence on the recovery rate can be shown for cases in which an amicable
agreement can be achieved.
Secondly, the existing studies on recovery rates usually use data from just one
bank (e.g., Dermine and Neto de Carvalho 2006; Grunert and Weber 2009; Leow
and Mues 2012; Zhang and Thomas 2012; Tong et al. 2012, 2013), which raises the
issue of the generality of the empirical results. Our data set comes from BAG, a
bank that specializes in the acquisition of non-performing loans. Therefore, we can
analyze a sample of 909 defaulting loans that were made by 123 different banks, and
our findings are not driven by the particular actions of a single bank.
1 A study conducted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) concludes that for
almost all banking segments, the capital requirements are reduced when switching from the
standard approach to the IRB approach.
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Thirdly, other studies have also been able to prove the intuitive view that
recovery rates are significantly higher if loans are collateralized (e.g., Thorburn
2000; Grunert and Weber 2009; Qi and Yang 2009; Bastos 2010; Gu¨rtler and
Hibbeln 2013). However, most recovery rate studies consider the collateral value as
given (exceptions are, for example, Jokivuolle and Peura 2003; Somers and
Whittaker 2007; Leow and Mues 2012). We take a closer look at the valuation of
collateral itself and, in particular, at the valuation of collateral in real estate. A
couple of studies for the German market analyze the proceeds ratio of collateral
(realized proceeds divided by the fundamental value of the collateral assumed by
the bank) (Franks et al. 2004; Schaaff 2009; Grunert 2010). These studies show that
the realized proceeds are, on average, smaller than the original valuation of the
collateral. Our results confirm these earlier findings. For the originating bank, the
valuation (market value) of the collateral in real estate is based on the appraisal
report, which is a proxy for the expected selling price. Since the appraisal report
should consider all possible factors that have an influence on the property value, the
realized selling price should not differ systematically from the expected value. For
the first time in recovery rate research, our method uses an index based on postal
codes to measure the attractiveness of a property’s location and to arrange for the
finest possible discrimination between different locations and property types. We
demonstrate that the condition as well as the location of the property, even on
average, is not adequately considered in the appraisal reports. To correct for this
systematic bias, we develop a model to predict the proceeds ratio to eliminate the
bias in the valuation of properties.
Fourthly, banks commonly apply a flat haircut to the collateral value. For
collateral in real estate, this haircut ranges between 10 and 40 % in Germany (see,
e.g., Grunert and Weber 2009; Bruhn 2009; Pfnu¨r 2011). Hence, we apply flat
haircuts to the collateral values to adjust the collateralization ratios and explain the
recovery rate again. In comparison to the flat haircuts, we use predicted proceeds
ratios to adjust the market value of real estate. We thereby obtain an adjusted
collateralization ratio that can also be used to explain the recovery rate. Both
adjustments of the collateralization ratios considerably increase the explanatory
power of the original model, whereas the haircut models perform worse in terms of
explanatory power in comparison to the models using model-adjusted collateral-
ization ratios.
Furthermore, the validity of our results can be demonstrated using various out-of-
sample tests. Our findings indicate that the combined analysis of the collateral and
borrower levels should be an important part of the analysis of factors influencing the
recovery rate in future empirical studies.
Our study provides valuable insights into the practice of banking with regard to
the design of adequate models, and provides optimization advice with respect to the
collection and processing of data. The results are of particular importance for small
and medium-sized banks, such as savings banks and cooperative banks. The
customer segment analyzed here is the core clientele for these businesses. And
banks, because of to their size, often do not have the appropriate number of cases to
perform a comparable analysis.
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Our paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 3, we derive our research hypotheses
and present the data set. Then, we analyze our hypotheses using bivariate and
multivariate analyses in Sect. 4. Afterwards, we check the valuation of collateral in
real estate for systematic biases. In Sect. 5, we correct for the recognized biases and
use the adjusted collateralization ratios for a new approach to explaining the
recovery rate. Section 6 summarizes the results.
3 Empirical analysis of the recovery rate on the borrower level
3.1 Derivation of the research hypotheses
In contrast to the practice for defaulted bonds, it has become common practice to
use the so-called workout method for the determination of the recovery rate on bank
loans. When a debtor defaults, the individual proceeds (e.g., the realization proceeds
from collateral) as well as the costs of the workout-process (e.g., material and
personnel costs, and legal expenses) are determined for each time t. The proceeds
and expenses are discounted to the time of default to take the present value of
money into account.2 Putting the aggregated net proceeds in relation to the EAD at









Empirical studies analyzing the recovery rate for bank loans have analyzed a
number of potential influencing factors. However, the results regarding most of the
factors are ambiguous. Franks et al. (2004), for example, identify a significant,
positive influence of macroeconomic factors on the recovery rate, while these
factors have no influence according to a study by Dermine and Neto de Carvalho
(2006). Yet, nearly all studies (e.g., Carty et al. 1998; Gupton et al. 2000; Thorburn
2000; Bos et al. 2002; Araten et al. 2004; Emery et al. 2004; Franks et al. 2004;
Hamilton et al. 2004; Grunert and Weber 2009; Qi and Yang 2009; Bastos 2010;
Gu¨rtler and Hibbeln 2013) demonstrate that the recovery rate is higher if loans are
collateralized.
We also expect a higher recovery rate for loans with a higher collateralization
ratio, since the bank can generate higher proceeds from the collateral provided. As
the null hypothesis is to be rejected, we state:
Hypothesis 1 (H1) The collateralization ratio has no significant effect on the
recovery rate.
2 The risk-free interest rate r, the contractually agreed interest rate (the variable interest rate might
be weighted so that it is time related), the return on equity, or the effective interest rate in the sense
of IAS 39, can all be used as the interest rate r for the discounting factor. No explicit specifications
are made by the Basel Committee.
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Besides collateral accounted for on a value basis (in EUR), in the banking
practice there are additional types of collateral that, although they may result in
realization proceeds, are not taken into account because of legal uncertainty or
market dependence in general. By analogy to the collateralization ratio, we would
expect those to influence the recovery rate positively and formulate as the null
hypothesis to be rejected:
Hypothesis 2 (H2) Additional collateral that is not accounted for on a value basis
(in EUR) has no effect on the recovery rate.
Studies by Elsas and Krahnen (2002), Grippa et al. (2005), and Grunert and
Weber (2009) have identified the process by which borrowers are put into default as
another important factor influencing the recovery rate. Generally, there are three
essential processes through which borrowers are put into default: continuing their
business activities in line with a restructuring, an amicable settlement (redemption),
and the liquidation of the loan and the provided collateral. For economic reasons,
continuing business activities is only applicable to sufficiently large debtors, which
are usually corporate customers.3 Active restructuring, that is, the bank arranging an
operational and strategic realignment, is rarely possible or economically reasonable
for retail and commercial customers.
With retail and commercial customers, the banks prefer direct negotiations in an
attempt to achieve an amicable agreement or, if necessary, they settle for receiving
only part of the receivables. If an amicable settlement can be achieved, redemption4
is agreed on.5 The debtor then makes the previously agreed redemption payment,
while the bank releases the provided collateral in return. The bank will, however,
only accept a redemption payment if the payment that is offered equals at least the
sum of the expected discounted (net) returns from the collateral and the cost of
personal arbitration measures against the debtor (lower bound). On the other hand,
the debtor will not pay back more than the outstanding liability (upper bound). In
the case of redemption, the redemption payment should lie within the interval
identified above. The difference between the realized redemption payment and the
lower bound constitutes the premium. If negotiations fail or are not possible because
3 In the study by Grunert and Weber (2009), who analyze 120 defaulting corporate customers of a
single German bank, 40 % were able to continue their business operations and, therefore, this type
of workout had a significant influence on the recovery rate. Even though the study by Elsas and
Krahnen (2002) can only be considered to lie partly in the field of recovery rate research, the
authors show continuing operations after restructuring for 85 % of 128 German corporate
customers.
4 It should be noted that redemption in this sense is different to the ’statutory right of redemption’
that is given by law in some US states. For the influence of the ’statutory right of redemption’ on
the recovery rate see, e.g., Qi and Yang (2009) and Park and Bang (2014).
5 Amicable agreements (redemptions) are somewhat different to so-called ’cured’ cases that have
recently been discussed in the default prediction literature (e.g., Tong et al. 2012; Wolter and
Ro¨sch 2014). While ’cured’ cases always show a 100 % recovery (see Wolter and Ro¨sch 2014 for a
brief introduction to ’cured’ events), amicable agreements do not necessarily lead to a full recovery
(the average recovery rate for amicable agreements in our sample is 82 %; see Table 1).
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of the debtor’s lack of financial assets, the bank can only fall back to the third form
of the workout-process, the liquidation of the collateral.6
In their analysis of 11,649 defaulted loans to retail customers and SMEs in Italy,
Grippa et al. (2005) demonstrate that an amicable agreement between the bank and
the borrower was achieved in 41 % of the cases. However, there is a specific
characteristic of their study: the authors did not derive the percentage of
redemptions from the individual debtors’ data; the percentage was identified by
the participating banks in a survey. To perform a multivariate analysis, the authors
combined bank-specific data (here, the estimated fraction of redemptions) with
other surveyed quantitative data (individual information regarding the individual
loans, collateral, etc.). Thereby, they were able to demonstrate a significant, positive
influence of the workout type, redemption, on the recovery rate. We again form the
null to be rejected:
Hypothesis 3 (H3) Amicable agreements with the debtors (redemptions) have no
effect on the recovery rate.
3.2 Data and descriptive statistics
Our data set was provided by Bankaktiengesellschaft Hamm (BAG). BAG was
founded to resolve the troubled Hammer Bank Spadaka eG, and therefore formed
Germany’s first bad bank. In the years following its foundation, BAG regularly took
over sub-performing loans from troubled cooperative banks, because it had the
necessary know-how. At the beginning of 2005, BAG started to offer its services—
the acquisition and management of sub-performing loans—to the whole German
banking sector. As is common in the context of the acquisition of sub-performing
loans, BAG will take over the whole settlement and liquidation risk, and will cope
with the risk via a sufficiently low purchase price.
The full sample contains information on 909 debtors that were transferred to
BAG between December 2005 and August 2010. The following analysis of the
recovery rate for debtors (borrower level) in Sect. 3 only includes the 499 debtors
whose workout-processes had been completed.7 The workout-process is considered
to be completed when collateral has been processed entirely, or when an amicable
agreement has been reached.
The analysis of individual collateral (collateral level) in Sect. 4 includes all 909
debtors and considers all collateral for which the workout-process is completed.
6 When liquidating, the bank tries to sell the collateral that has been provided for as much as
possible, and may initiate arbitration measures against the individual debtor (e.g., the attachment of
his wages or salary).
7 The authors are aware of the potential selection bias. Cases with long workout-processes are
underrepresented in this sample since only cases where the workout-process is completed are
considered. The average recovery rate could be overestimated, because defaults with a relatively
long workout-process usually show lower recovery rates (see Gu¨rtler and Hibbeln 2013). However,
we find in our subsequent analysis no significant influence of the duration of the workout-process
on the recovery rate. Moreover, the average duration of a workout-process in our sample is
relatively long (31.5 months), with a maximum of 69 months. Consequently, we consider this
potential selection bias to be negligible.
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Whether a debtor or a particular item of collateral was included in our analysis at the
borrower or the collateral level is illustrated in Fig. 1.
The data set also contains encoded information about the bank that originally
granted the loan. As a result, we are able to conclude that the debtors were
transferred to BAG by 123 different banks that are predominantly part of the
cooperative banking sector.8 For this reason, the data set to a large extent reflects the
customer structure of cooperative banks, which is typically composed of retail and
commercial (self-employed and SMEs) customers, whereas larger corporations
(corporate customers) are usually provided with financial services in cooperation
with or exclusively by the banks’ central institutions (i.e., ‘‘Landesbanken’’ for
savings banks and cooperative central banks for cooperative banks).
Since our data set is obtained from BAG—a bank that specializes in the
acquisition of sub-performing loans—the question arises whether the data set is
subject to a further sample selection bias in that only a fraction of sub-performing
loans are transferred to BAG. It may be that banks do not offer unsecured or smaller
sub-performing loans to BAG, and directly depreciate these loans instead. On the
contrary, the opposite may happen and only unsecured loans are transferred to BAG.
Fig. 1 Inclusion of cases in the
borrower and collateral levels
8 For the 123 banks, we are unaware of the exact outstanding loan volume (and the number of
debtors) that were transferred to BAG, as our sample only includes those debtors whose workout-
processes had already been entirely completed or at least had been completed for one collateral.
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7 % of the loans in our sample are completely unsecured loans. This fraction seems
very low, but since most of our loans are real estate loans, and such loans are
typically collateralized, this fraction seems plausible. Ko¨nig and Beimborn (2008)
conducted a survey among the 1020 largest German banks. The authors report an
average SME loan size on the books of EUR 470,000. This number is comparable to
the average EAD for SMEs of EUR 490,000 (median EUR 329,000) in our sample
(see Table 1). Dr. Klein & Co. AG (2012) state that the average loan size for
properties in Germany for retail customers is about EUR 160,000. This is below the
average EAD for retail customers in our sample, which is EUR 213,000, but is
above the median of EUR 130,000. Another possibility is that banks only transfer
difficult loans that are hard to manage to BAG. This should lead to lower recovery
rates compared to the German average. Hesse et al. (2012) report in their survey of
cooperative banks and savings banks in Germany an average recovery rate for
savings banks of 54 % and for cooperative banks of 52 %, both with a median of
55 %. These recovery rates are just slightly below the ones in our sample: we find
an average of 58 % and a median of 59 %. Our data set is, therefore, in terms of
EAD and recovery rate, comparable to the German average. Nevertheless, the
selection biases mentioned above cannot be ruled out with absolute certainty. Yet
the pieces of evidence mentioned indicate that any remaining bias should not be so
severe that our analysis of the valuation of collateral is significantly affected.
Another concern is related to the relatively small sample size. But studies for the
German market usually consist, because of limited data availability, of even fewer
observations (Franks et al. 2004 have 276 observations, and Grunert 2005; Grunert
and Volk 2008; Grunert and Weber 2009 all use the same data set consisting of 120
observations). One exception in terms of data points is the study by Gu¨rtler and
Hibbeln (2013), in which 69,985 relatively small sub-performing consumer loans
are analyzed. But, since there is not yet a similar study that analyzes larger loans to
individuals and SMEs for Germany, we consider our sample size of 499
(respectively, 909) debtors to be appropriate in comparison to other German
studies. In addition, a problem for a majority of the existing recovery rate studies is
that their data stems from just a single bank (e.g., Dermine and Neto de Carvalho
2006; Grunert and Weber 2009; Leow and Mues 2012; Zhang and Thomas 2012;
Tong et al. 2012, 2013), which also raises the issue of the generality of the empirical
results. Our data stem, in contrast, from 123 different banks, which makes it
possible for us to rule out the peculiarities of a specific bank’s loans.
For the analysis, we first determine the recovery rate (RRj) for every debtor j 2
ð1; 2; . . .; 499Þ. In our data set, the proceeds include the returns from the liquidation
of any possible collateral as well as the payments made by the debtor. Costs include
all external costs (e.g., costs for arbitration measures, the real estate agent’s
commission fees, etc.).9 Determining the EAD appears to be critical, since the exact
time of the default event as well as the criteria for the default are not known.10
9 As for many other studies in this field (e.g., Grippa et al. 2005; Grunert and Weber 2009), we
have no information regarding the internal costs.
10 See Grunert and Volk (2008) regarding the influence of the definition of a default event when
determining the recovery rate.
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Therefore, we use the definition of a default event specified under the Basel Accord.
Following Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), a loan is considered to
be in default if the bank is selling the loan obligation and thereby accepting an
economic loss. Due to the reduction in the selling price, selling a receivable to BAG
always satisfies this definition.11 Hence, we take the debtor’s existing liabilities at
the time of transfer to BAG as the exposure at default (EAD). Using this definition,
the difficulty of employing inconsistent definitions of a default event among the 123
included banks can be avoided.
For the EAD, we only have aggregated information; we are not, therefore, able to
identify the types of loans (i.e., credit line, housing loan, etc.) that were originally
granted. While other studies analyzing the retail and/or commercial customers
segment determine the recovery rate for every loan individually,12 we follow the
approach used in studies on corporate customers (e.g., Grunert and Weber 2009) and
look at the debtor as a unit by summing up all the loans and collateral for each
customer. Focusing on the debtor as a unit instead of looking at each loan
individually matches with the viewpoint of banking practice in Germany. First, the
liens created under the general terms of business in Germany can be used for
collateralizing all the loans of one debtor. Second, an amicable settlement covers the
total commitment instead of individual loans and pieces of collateral.
A number of theoretical works (see e.g., Frye 2000; Pykhtin 2003; Altman et al.
2005; Bade et al. 2011; Ro¨sch and Scheule 2014) suggest that default and recovery
processes are negatively correlated. Empirical studies confirm this negative
relationship between recovery rates and default probabilities (see e.g., Bade et al.
2011). One channel for this correlation may be the collateral value. In the case of an
economic downturn, more borrowers default and the collateral value drops at the
same time (Frye 2000). Heckman (1979) demonstrates that isolated models for two
variables lead to biased parameter estimates if the two variables are correlated, and
one variable can be observed only if the other variable exceeds a particular
threshold. The higher the correlation between both variables the larger is the bias of
the parameter estimates (Bade et al. 2011). As realized recovery rates can only be
observed if a default event occurred, our study is also affected by this potential bias.
A solution to this problem would be the application of an appropriate selection
model (e.g., a Heckman selection model). Selection models correct the parameter
estimates of a recovery rate regression for the probability of a default in the first
place. However, since our data set solely contains finally defaulted borrowers, we do
not see any way for us to apply a selection model here. Furthermore, the data set
11 Furthermore, the origin of our data is the reason why we cannot observe potential recoveries of
non-defaulted loans. If a loan is sold to BAG the originating bank is finally admitting that the
borrower has defaulted. Following this reasoning, our data set solely contains finally defaulted
customers, and no ‘cured’ cases. This sample selection issue is a problem for default prediction
studies (see, for a brief discussion, Wolter and Ro¨sch 2014), but the focus of our study lies on
finally defaulted loans, their recovery rates, and the valuation of their collateral.
12 This approach is especially reasonable when dealing with certain types of loans, such as credit
card debt (e.g., Bellotti and Crook 2012), consumer credit (e.g., Gu¨rtler and Hibbeln 2013) or
vehicle financing (e.g., Appasamy et al. 2008). Particularly for automotive financing as asset
financing, there is a close relationship between loan and collateral.
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does not give any information about characteristics at the time when the loan was
originally granted, such as the debtor’s creditworthiness (i.e., credit rating), the
interest rate, or the original loan amount. Therefore, all our following results have to
be considered under the shortcoming of potentially biased parameter estimates.
Not only the EAD but also the proceeds and the expenses were only available in
an aggregated form and without explicit information regarding their timing.
However, Franks et al. (2004) and Schaaff (2009) demonstrate in their research only
a marginal difference between the results if the present value is used and if not. In
combination with the historically low level of interest rates during the time of
observation, we consider the impact of not discounting to be negligible—partly
because of the absence of discounting, it is, therefore, possible for the recovery rate
to take on a value greater than 1. On the other hand, the recovery rate can take a
negative value if the costs exceed the proceeds. In the same way as most empirical
studies (e.g., Friedman and Sandow 2003; Grippa et al. 2005; Khieu et al. 2012;
Loterman et al. 2012), we limit the recovery rate to the interval [0, 1]. This is done
by setting all negative values to zero and all values above the unit interval to one.
This data censoring influences the distribution of the recovery rate and can cause
some problems. The issue of censored data was first mentioned by Tobin (1958) and
is further discussed among others, by Greene (2012). Calabrese and Zenga (2010)
address this issue in the context of recovery rates. In a robustness check, we
excluded all cases that were censored (see Table 16 in the Appendix). Our results
stay qualitatively the same. Therefore, we consider the potential problems caused by
this censoring to be negligible.
Figure 2 shows, on the left-hand side (a), the frequency distributions of the
unbounded recovery rate. There are peaks at 0 and 100 %; this bimodality can be
found in almost all empirical studies (e.g., Asarnow and Edwards 1995; Hurt and
Felsovalyi 1998; Araten et al. 2004; Grippa et al. 2005; Dermine and Neto de
Carvalho 2006; Caselli et al. 2008). Some recoveries are below 0 % if the costs
exceed the proceeds, and some are above 100 % if the net proceeds exceed the
EAD. This finding is common if workout recovery rates are calculated. Araten et al.
(2004), for example, report recovery rates between -10 and 173 %. The maximum
observed recovery rate in our sample is 191 % and the minimum is -34 %. In total,
Fig. 2 Histograms of realized recovery rates
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15 cases are below 0 % and 120 are above 100 %. On the right-hand side (b) of
Fig. 2, the distribution of the censored recovery rate limited to the unit interval is
displayed. The bimodality mentioned before is now even more pronounced. Table 1
contains the descriptive statistics of the variables on the borrower level and shows
an average recovery rate of 58 % (median of 59 %).
The 499 customers were, as mentioned earlier, transferred to BAG between
December 2005 and August 2010. Table 2 clearly shows that the number of
transfers per year, as well as the corresponding recovery rates, differ over the
observation time. Most customers were transferred in 2005 (143) and in 2007 (244).
The average recovery rate per year was the highest in 2010 at 85 % (for just a single
observation) and the lowest was in 2006 at 45 %. Table 2 also presents the
distribution of the transferred cases per customer type.
As to collateral, BAG only considers certain collateral on a value basis (in EUR);
this includes money in accounts (e.g., building loan contracts, savings deposits,
endowment life insurances, etc.) and collateral in real estate. The collateral value of
money in accounts (CVdeposit) equals the corresponding balance or the surrender
value at the time of the transfer.
The value of collateral in real estate (CVreal estate) results from a sequential
calculation. Possible existing preloads (PL) are subtracted from the most recent
valuation of the property (MV).13 Moreover, the collateral value is limited to the
sum of the property’s recorded land charge (LC).14 The collateral value of real
estate i is, therefore, given by
CVreal estatei ¼ MAXðMINðMVi  PLi;LCiÞ; 0Þ ¼ MINðMAXðMVi  PLi; 0Þ;LCiÞ:
ð2Þ
Table 2 Default years and recovery rates
Default year Full sample Retail customers Commercial customers
N £ RR N Fraction (%) £ RR N Fraction (%) £ RR
2005 143 0.71 102 71.3 0.72 41 28.7 0.67
2006 35 0.45 16 45.7 0.40 19 54.3 0.48
2007 244 0.52 192 78.7 0.51 52 21.3 0.53
2008 64 0.59 46 71.9 0.60 18 28.1 0.55
2009 12 0.57 11 91.7 0.58 1 8.3 0.46
2010 1 0.85 1 100.0 0.85 0 0.0 –
13 The most recent valuation is the value resulting from the most recent appraisal report at the time
of the transfer and is materially equivalent to the fair value used in international accounting. For the
different types of appraisal reports, see Sect. 4.2.
14 The German Civil Code (BGB) defines two types of collateral in real estate. The ‘mortgage’
(Hypothek) is used for accessory charges on property and the ‘land charge’ (Grundschuld) is used
for non-accessory charges on property. In contrast to the ‘mortgage’, a ‘land charge’ continues to
exist even if the debt is extinguished. ‘Land charges’ are common in German banking practice and
‘mortgages’ are only rarely used. See European Mortgage Federation (2007) for further
information on the ‘mortgage’ and the ‘land charge’ in Germany.
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Other studies do not provide many details on how they determine the collateral
value, but it can be assumed that the CVreal estate determined by the bank is applied.
We, on the other hand, explicitly combine information from different sources for
each collateral individually to determine the CVreal estate using formula (2). The total
collateral value for every debtor j is computed by summing up m collateral values in
real estate and n collateral values of money in accounts.
Depending on the quality and quantity of the available data, the collateral can be
displayed in various ways in an analysis. Dermine and Neto de Carvalho (2006)
incorporate the collateral using binary variables for every type of collateral
(collateral in real estate, guarantees, etc.). In contrast, more recent studies (Caselli
et al. 2008; Grunert and Weber 2009; Qi and Yang 2009; Leow and Mues 2012;
Park and Bang 2014) take collateral into account using a collateralization ratio or its
inverse, the (current) loan-to-value ratio, which both represent the relation between
the bank’s valuation of the collateral and the EAD. We follow this approach and













A collateralization ratio above 1 reflects over-collateralization. We limit the col-
lateralization ratio—in line with the banking practice—to a maximum of 1.15
On average, the collateralization ratio is 66 %, with only a small percentage
(approx. 6–7 %) of debtors not providing any collateral at all (CR = 0; see Fig. 3).
Our data set thus shows a significantly lower percentage of unsecured liabilities
Fig. 3 Frequency distribution of collateralization ratio
15 This limitation is also used by Grunert and Weber (2009). The issue discussed earlier caused by
censoring of the distribution is also valid for the collateralization ratio.
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compared to other studies.16 This could be caused, as discussed earlier, by the origin
of the data set. It is possible that unsecured liabilities are directly depreciated by the
originating bank and rarely offered for purchase to BAG.
The average collateral values—EUR 160,000 for collateral in the form of real
estate and EUR 41,000 for collateral in money in accounts—lead to the conclusion
that the collateralization ratio is mainly determined by the collateral in real estate.
The collateralization in our data set is comparable to that in the study of Qi and
Yang (2009), who even show a collateralization ratio of 100 %. The 240,000
mortgages of US retail customers included in their study may explain the higher
collateralization ratio. Interestingly, there is a larger difference in the collateral-
ization rate (100 vs. 66 %) than in the realized recovery ratio (70 vs. 58 %).
To assess whether additional collateral not recognized on a value basis (in EUR)
has an effect on the recovery rate (H2), we determine the variable COL as the
number of additional pieces of collateral (e.g., individual assignments of claims,
global or overall assignments, assignments of loan receivables, guarantees or
transfers of ownership of vehicles, machinery and warehouses) that are not
recognized on a value basis (in EUR). On average, 1.8 additional pieces of collateral
(median: 1) are pledged.
Since there is no restructuring for the debtors in our data set, we only differentiate
between an amicable agreement and a liquidation to assess Hypothesis H3. The binary
variable redemption (RED) takes a value of 1 if an amicable agreement between BAG
and the debtor was reached. The portion of redemptions in our data set amounts to 40 %
(195 out of 499 cases). This proportion is consistent with the survey results of Hesse
et al. (2012) for cooperative banks and savings banks in Germany regarding problem
loans. According to their 171 responses, the average proportion of redemptions equals
34 %.Grippa et al. (2005) report a fraction of 41 %of such private agreements between
debtors and banks for an Italian sample and find for these cases a considerably higher
recovery rate of 68 % compared to their overall average of 37 %.
To check for scale efficiencies via the credit volume, we utilize the logarithm of
the EAD (EADLN) which is EUR 286,000 in our sample. Additionally, we consider
the duration of the workout-process in months (WOP). BAG’s purchase of a certain
liability marks the starting point, and the completion of the workout-process marks
the end of the workout-process for a debtor. On average the workout-process lasts
31.5 months, which is considerably lower than the average duration of 54 months
reported by Calabrese and Zenga (2010) for Italy. Khieu et al. (2012), on the other
hand, state an average duration of the workout time in their US sample of just 14
months. As to the debtor, we differentiate between 368 retail and 131 commercial
(self-employed and SMEs) customers. The binary variable borrower type (BT) takes
a value of 1 if the debtor is a commercial customer. The variable INS shows the
status of bankruptcy and takes a value of 1 if the debtor is declared bankrupt before
or during the workout-process, which is the case for 87 observations. The annual
16 36 % of the 374 loans to defaulting small- and medium-sized companies in Portugal analyzed
by Dermine and Neto de Carvalho (2006) were unsecured. Nevertheless, a recovery rate of 71 %
was achieved. However, there is no information regarding the collateralization ratio. A high portion
of unsecured securities also becomes evident in a study by Jime´nez and Saurina (2002) on the
Spanish market.
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growth rate of the real gross domestic product (GDP) and the unemployment rate
(UER) at the time of default (i.e., transfer to BAG) take the role of macroeconomic
control variables.17
To analyze the extent to which there are differences between retail and
commercial customers, important variables are presented by borrower type in
Table 3. It becomes obvious that loans to commercial customers exhibit, on average,
a lower collateralization ratio (58 vs. 70 %). But commercial customers pledge, on
average, in contrast to the results for the collateralization ratio, a higher number of
additional pieces of collateral (3.0 vs. 1.2). One reason may be that commercial
customers are usually in possession of more specific assets that can be used as
collateral (e.g., special purpose machines). By looking at the customer structure, the
average EAD (EUR 213,000 for retail customers and EUR 490,000 for commercial
customers) demonstrates again that our study is quite different from studies of
classical corporate customers, e.g., of Grunert and Weber (2009) who found a mean
value of EUR 5.6 million.
3.3 Bivariate analysis
In the same way as in Grunert and Weber (2009), the Bravais and Pearson
correlation coefficient is used for the bivariate analysis of the metric variables (see
Table 12 in the Appendix). There is a strong significant positive correlation of 0.7
between the collateralization ratio and the recovery rate (Hypothesis H1). Thereby,
Hypothesis H1 of no association can be rejected in the bivariate context. The
correlation coefficient for additional collateral (COL) equals 0.03, which leads to
the conclusion that Hypothesis H2 cannot be rejected. Furthermore, there are no
other remarkable correlations between the control variables.
The binary analysis of the influence of redemption may lead to the conclusion
that Hypothesis H3 can be rejected. The average recovery rate of redemptions (0.82)
is considerably higher than the rate of liquidation (0.42; see Table 1). Interestingly,
we find a significant positive correlation (0.31) between redemption and the
collateralization ratio (see Table 12 in the Appendix). In the following multivariate
analysis, we are going to assess whether redemption can influence the recovery rate
beyond the collateralization ratio.
Table 3 Comparison of retail and commercial customers












Retail customer 368 0.70 1.20 39 213 30.72 0.58
Commercial
customer
131 0.58 3.00 38 490 33.60 0.57
17 According to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), banks have to consider
economic upswings when estimating the recovery rate. These requirements are satisfied, following
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005), using the variation of both the GDP and the
unemployment rate.
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3.4 Multivariate analysis
In this section, we analyze the influence of the nine previously introduced variables
on the recovery rate of debtor j. To do so, we use a Fractional Logit Model, similar
to the one used in the studies by Grippa et al. (2005), Dermine and Neto de
Carvalho (2006), Bastos (2010) and Khieu et al. (2012), among others:18
RRj;t ¼ b0 þ b1  CRj þ b2  COLj þ b3  REDj þ b4  EADLNj
þ b5 WOPj þ b6  BTj þ b7  INSj þ b8  GDPt þ b9  UERt þ j:
ð4Þ
Using the Fractional Logit Model with robust standard errors that are clustered for
the originating bank leads to the estimation results listed in Table 4.
Table 4 Fractional Logit regression with the recovery rate as dependent variable











CR 0.6291*** (0.212) 0.6040*** (0.297) 0.7150*** (0.428)
H2
COL 0.0368 (0.036) 0.0427 (0.045) 0.0523 (0.045)
H3
RED 0.3813*** (0.134) 0.4286*** (0.147) 0.2982*** (0.268)
Control variables
EADLN 0.0277 (0.070) 0.1002** (0.080) -0.1494** (0.108)
WOP 0.0062 (0.005) -0.0292 (0.007) 0.0130 (0.011)
BT 0.0691** (0.134)
INS -0.0689** (0.161) -0.0757* (0.202) -0.0019 (0.198)
GDP -0.0359 (0.038) -0.0386 (0.362) 0.0289 (0.061)
UER 0.0828 (0.073) 0.0624 (0.073) 0.1495* (0.106)
Constant -4.0712*** (1.007) -5.3583*** (1.224) -1.0187 (1.485)
Observations 499 368 131
AIC 0.7994 0.7989 0.8838
BIC -2893.48 -2013.36 -563.08
Mc Fadden R2 0.3304 0.3411 0.3348
R2 0.6324 0.6350 0.6925
Adj. R2 0.6256 0.6268 0.6724
Wald test (p-value) 467.95 (0.000) 390.85 (0.000) 273.84 (0.000)
***, **, * indicates a 1, 5 and 10 % confidence level. The robust standard errors that are clustered for the
originating bank are given in brackets
18 The Fractional Logit Model is considered to be a Generalized Linear Model and is specifically
designed for a dependent variable in the interval [0;1] when there is a positive probability that the
values 0 and 1 can be realized.
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Model (1) shows the estimation results including the borrower type using the
binary variable BT. We have already illustrated (see Table 3) that there is a big
difference between the two types of customers, for example, with respect to the
collateralization ratio. Therefore, we split the sample into the two customer types
[Model (2a) = retail customers and Model (2b) = commercial customers]. This
sample split allows for an individual analysis of the independent variables. By doing
so, we are able to demonstrate differences in the influence of the other independent
variables.
Regardless of the customer type it can be shown that the collateralization ratio
has a strong positive influence on the recovery rate (p\0:01). Therefore,
Hypothesis 1 (H1) can be rejected in the multivariate context. The outstanding
importance of the collateralization ratio is not surprising since it is mainly
determined by collateral in the form of real estate, to which a high fundamental
value has been attributed. Our result is in line with the empirical literature on
recovery rates (e.g., Grunert and Weber 2009; Qi and Yang 2009; Bastos 2010;
Gu¨rtler and Hibbeln 2013). The straightforward explanation for this finding is that
either the direct realization of the collateral results in direct proceeds or, in the case
of an amicable agreement, the bank would only reach this agreement if the payment
offered equals at least the sum of the expected discounted (net) returns from the
collateral and the personal arbitration measures against the debtor.
As to Hypothesis H2, there is no significant influence in the multivariate analysis
of additional collateral (COL) on the recovery rate—neither for retail nor for
commercial customers, i.e., this hypothesis can not be rejected. This finding seems
surprising at first glance. A possible explanation for this finding is that additional
pieces of collateral are not recognized on a value basis (in EUR). These additional
pieces of collateral are usually very specific assets that are difficult to sell (e.g.,
special purpose machines) and, therefore, often did not yield any cash inflows. Their
specificity is why they were not or even could not be valued in the first place.
Different from H2, we have been able to reject Hypothesis H3. There is a
significantly positive coefficient for redemption, which shows a relation with the
recovery rate beyond the collateralization ratio. To identify the differences with respect
to the different workout-processes in more detail, we form the variable DIFj for each
debtor, which is the difference between the realized recovery rate (RRj) and the
collateralization ratio (CRj). If DIFj is positive, a premium can be realized. Figure 4
shows the distribution of DIF depending on the different workout-processes.
The distribution of DIF is reminiscent of the normal distribution; however, there are
too many observations with a negative difference (p-value 0.000 in the Shapiro–Wilk
test). Splitting the sample into the different workout-processes reveals the main
differences. The collateralization ratio is realized (DIF ¼ 0) for redemption in the
majority of the cases, which is intuitive considering that redemption is only optional
for BAG. From a relative viewpoint, there are significantlymore cases with a premium
since the related curve lies above the curve for the entire population for values of the x-
coordinate greater than 0 %. Reciprocally, there are, from a relative viewpoint, more
cases with a discount for liquidation. Altogether, our illustration regarding the
premium clarifies the positive influence of the redemption workout-process.
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Our results indicate an ambiguous influence of the outstanding loan amount
(EADLN). There is a positive, significant coefficient for retail customers, while the
coefficient is negative for commercial customers. Banks may intensify their effort in
the workout-process if the EAD is higher and, as a consequence, if higher losses are
possible. This could lead to a higher recovery rate for larger EAD. On the other
hand, it could be that higher outstanding amounts are more difficult for the borrower
to pay back, which could lead to a lower recovery rate. The empirical evidence for
the influence of the EAD on the recovery rate is mixed. Bellotti and Crook (2012)
find a significant negative influence of a higher EAD on the recovery rate, while
Tong et al. (2013) find the opposite effect. Another possible explanation for our
finding is offered by the premium (DIFj is positive). For retail customers, there is a
positive (but weak) correlation between the outstanding credit volume and the
premium (see Fig. 5a), expressed in a decreasing liquidation risk with increasing
volume. The inverse relation exists for commercial customers (see Fig. 5b).
Fig. 4 Distribution of difference (DIF) dependent on the workout type
Fig. 5 Scatter plots of difference (DIF) dependent on the exposure at default (EADLN)
Business Research (2016) 9:179–228 197
123
The status of bankruptcy (INS) is accompanied by a significantly lower recovery
rate for retail customers (p\0:1). This finding is in line with the results of Han and
Jang (2013). Since the proceeds from bankrupt debtors only come from the
collateral provided, with no further payments to be expected, the relation appears
coherent. Moreover, an amicable agreement is less likely, because there are no other
assets or sources of financing available for redemption due to the debtor’s
bankruptcy. Therefore, the fraction of redemptions for bankrupt retail customers is
significantly lower (5 %) than that for non-bankrupt debtors (46 %; see Table 5).
Calabrese and Zenga (2010) and Gu¨rtler and Hibbeln (2013) argue that defaulted
borrowers with a long workout-process yield lower recovery rates. This could be
driven by the additional costs that arise over time. Caselli et al. (2008), Qi and Yang
(2009) and Khieu et al. (2012) find, in line with this argument, a negative influence
of the length of the workout-process on the recovery rate. We cannot confirm their
findings, since we find no significant coefficient of the duration of the workout-
process on the recovery rate.
Some empirical studies find a significant positive relation between real GDP
growth and the recovery rate (e.g., Khieu et al. 2012; Han and Jang 2013; Park and
Bang 2014). An explanation for this finding could be that when the economy is in a
poor state defaulters are less able to repay their debt, which negatively influences
the recovery rate, and vice versa. But a few studies, on the other hand, find no
significant relation (see e.g., Dermine and Neto de Carvalho 2006) or, especially for
the case of Germany, the opposite effect (see Franks et al. 2004 as well as Grunert
and Weber 2009 who show this result for the regional GDP growth). However, our
results show no significant relation between real GDP growth and the recovery rate.
We find a weak significant positive relation between the unemployment rate and
the recovery rate for commercial customers. This finding is in contrast to the
findings of Bellotti and Crook (2012) and Park and Bang (2014). Bellotti and Crook
(2012) argue that an increase in the level of unemployment means that most people
find themselves in circumstances where they cannot repay their loans, which lowers
the average recovery rate. Grunert and Weber (2009) find no significant influence on
the recovery rate for their German sample. Our counterintuitive finding of a positive
relationship between the level of unemployment and the recovery rate could be
driven by our sample period. The unemployment rate is quite high in 2005 and
2006, at 11.7 and 10.8 %, and drops to about 8 % between 2008 and 2010. The high
unemployment rate in 2005, which was associated with an above-average recovery
rate of 71 % for this year, is probably a particular driver for our finding. We
Table 5 Collateralization ratio, redemptions and differences dependent on the status of bankruptcy as
well as the borrower type
Borrower type Status of bankruptcy £ CR Fraction of RED (%) DIF-points (%)
Commercial customer 0 0.58 42.72 0.0033
1 0.56 21.43 -0.0468
Retail customer 0 0.72 45.95 -0.0895
1 0.59 5.08 -0.2488
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excluded all cases that were transferred to BAG in 2005 in a robustness test. All
coefficients for real GDP growth turn positive, and a positive significant influence
(p\0:01) for commercial customers [Model (2a)] can be seen. Moreover, two of the
three coefficients for the unemployment rate turn negative, and the earlier positive
impact for commercial customers loses its significance. All other results stay
qualitatively the same.
As to the macroeconomic factors, the variables recommended by the Basel
Committee—gross domestic product (GDP) and unemployment rate (UER)—can
only partly be confirmed to have an influence on the recovery rate for commercial
customers. To overcome the concern that our macroeconomic variables do not pick
up all the macroeconomic effects, we use year dummies for the respective default
year in a robustness test (see Table 14 in the Appendix). All our results stay
qualitatively the same. Therefore, we consider our macroeconomic variable setup to
be suitable.
We split our sample in a further robustness check among the two different
workout types liquidation and redemption. Table 17 in the Appendix shows the
results of the regressions [Models (13a) and (13b) for the liquidations, again divided
into the two customer types, and Models (14a) and (14b) for the redemptions]. Sign
and statistical significance of the collateralization ratio are confirmed in all models.
It is noticeable that the status of bankruptcy (INS) has a significant negative
influence on the recovery rate for both customer types only in the case of an
amicable agreement. An insolvency in conjunction with an amicable agreement is
only observed for nine customers (three retail and six commercial customers) in our
sample. The reliability of this particular result is, therefore, debatable. Nevertheless,
all other results are qualitatively unchanged. We, therefore, consider the joint
analyses of the two workout types to be appropriate.
In conclusion, the collateralization ratio (H1) and an amicable agreement
(redemption) (H3) have a positive influence on the recovery rate. Our model is able
to explain 63 and 67 %, respectively, of the variance using the adjusted R2 as a
measure. This high explanatory power for recovery rates of loans that are
predominantly collateralized by real estate is typical of empirical studies. Qi and
Yang (2009), for example, report an adjusted R2 of 61 % and Park and Bang (2014)
of as much as 74 %. The high explanatory power is mainly driven by the high
fundamental value of collateral in real estate. If the collateralization ratio is
excluded from the analysis, the adjusted R2 drops to 20 % for commercial
customers and to 39 % for retail customers. Qi and Yang (2009) achieve a similar
result with a reduction of the adjusted R2 from 61 to 15 % if the collateralization by
real estate is not included. Because of the major influence of the collateralization
ratio on the recovery rate, we are going to analyze the essential driver—the
valuation of the real estate—in the following section in more detail.
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4 Empirical analysis of the influence of the proceeds ratio
on the collateral level
4.1 Derivation of our research hypothesis
Since empirical studies have identified a significant positive influence of collateral on
the recovery rate, there has been a second strand of literature, in which the collateral
provided, instead of the individual debtors or loans, is studied. Studies in this field
analyze the fundamental value of different forms of collateral, such as collateral in
real estate, guarantees, etc. The fundamental value is measured by the proceeds ratio,
which relates the realized proceeds to the original fundamental value assumed by the
bank. Grunert (2010) analyzes potential factors influencing the proceeds ratio, based
on a German data set consisting of 104 pieces of collateral (of which 62 are collateral
in real estate). The average proceeds ratio is 61 %, and the author concludes that the
proceeds ratio fluctuates depending on the type of collateral. Franks et al. (2004)
analyze the fundamental value of collateral for 790 pieces of collateral in Germany,
France, and Great Britain. The German subsample consists of 120 pieces of collateral
with an average proceeds ratio of 73 % (median 77 %). The authors likewise
conclude that the average proceeds ratio fluctuates depending on the type of collateral.
Nevertheless, an above-average fundamental value of collateral in real estate is
pointed out. Their result coincides with practical experience: according to a survey
carried out by Grunert (2009), banking professionals have identified collateral in real
estate to have the highest fundamental value.
Following this result, Schaaff (2009) focuses on an isolated analysis of different
factors influencing the proceeds ratio of collateral in real estate. She analyzes 1120
pieces of collateral in real estate that were transferred to BAG between 1999 and
2005. The resulting average proceeds ratio amounts to 61 %, with a median of only
28 %. The strong discrepancy can be traced back to the fact that for 41 % of the
assets there was no cash inflow. This specific feature could be caused by the data set
itself. Even the author herself notes that the representativeness of the data set has to
be reviewed critically. The collateral used, as well as its most recent valuations,
originate from banks undergoing restructuring that have sought help from the
central organization of the cooperative banking group in Germany (Bundesverband
der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken) because of their economic
situation. The author identifies the macroeconomic environment, the type of
workout-process for the property, the size, and the location as some important
factors influencing the proceeds ratio.
Previous studies have shown average liquidation proceeds below the value
originally set by the bank, i.e., a proceeds ratio below 1. Therefore, the
collateralization ratio used to analyze the recovery rate is too high in most
empirical studies (exceptions are e.g., Jokivuolle and Peura 2003; Somers and
Whittaker 2007; Leow and Mues 2012) and this influences the results of the
recovery rate analysis. As previously mentioned, the collateralization ratio in our
sample is dominated by collateral in real estate. The collateral value of real estate
(CVreal estate) stems from a sequential calculation, as shown in formula (2), with the
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property’s latest valuation in the most recent appraisal report as the starting point.
According to §194 of the German Federal Building Code (BauGB), the valuation by
the appraiser (determination of the (expected) market value) should reflect the price
that can be achieved in an arm’s length transaction on an active market, considering
the specific qualities of the property such as its condition and location. The
realization of the (expected) market value is the price actually achieved on the
market. Following Kleiber and Simon (2007), this market price reflects the result of
negotiations between the seller and the buyer, who each have different opinions
regarding the object’s value, depending on their subjective and personal beliefs.
If it is assumed that the appraisal reports on the (expected) market value of real
estate consider all factors that can possibly influence its value, according to §194 of
the German Federal Building Code (BauGB), there should be no systematic
deviation from the realized prices.
Hypothesis 4 (H4) The proceeds ratio of real estate is not systematically biased.
4.2 Data, descriptive statistics and bivariate analysis
Our data set includes 1236 properties, relating to 909 debtors, that were sold
between May 2006 and January 2011. 470 of these properties were sold through
foreclosure auctions, and 248 by over-the-counter trades. Redemption took place in
376 of the cases.19 The remaining 142 objects are classified as ‘miscellaneous’. This
‘miscellaneous’ category comprises properties for which the realized market price
could not be found because, for example, the intention of liquidating was not
pursued any further due to extensive rights of third parties. In cases of redemption,
there is no objective market price since there is no market-oriented realization. If the
debtor’s EAD is smaller than the property’s market value, and if the liability is
completely repaid with the redemption payment, this yields a proceeds ratio of less
than 1. However, this cannot necessarily be traced back to the property alone. If a
debtor is in possession of more than one property, a package price is paid. Splitting
the price would always be subject to a criticism that an arbitrary figure had been
chosen, as the debtor’s willingness to pay for the individual properties is unknown.
Therefore, the property in a redemption case will not be considered in the following
analysis. Hence, in these cases as well as for the 142 ‘miscellaneous’ cases, the
realized market price is missing. For the explanatory model, we therefore only
consider 718 objects for which a realized market price is known, here from
foreclosure auctions and over-the-counter trades.
To measure the proceeds ratio (PR) for property i, we divide the realized market




Table 6 shows descriptive statistics for the variables on the collateral level.20
19 This matches approximately 30 % of the real estate. The previously mentioned portion of 40 %
is measured at the borrower level (195 out of 499 debtors).
20 The correlation between the variables is shown in Table 13 in the Appendix.
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The proceeds ratio is, on average, 78 %, with a median of 74 %. Because of
different definitions of the proceeds ratio and differences in the groups of the
originating banks, the proceeds ratio is only comparable to a limited extent with the
results of other studies. Schaaff (2009) reports an average proceeds ratio of 62 %
(median of 28 %) and Grunert (2010) of 61 % (median of 53 %).21 The average
market value of the properties is EUR 200,000 with a median of EUR 122,000. This
value is higher than in the study by Schaaff (2009), whose figures show EUR
108,000 on average and a median of EUR 40,000.
The specific characteristics of our data set mean that we can distinguish between
three types of experts providing appraisal reports on the market value of a property.
If there is a report prepared by the originating bank (BANK) or a judicial report
(COURT) available at the time of transfer of the loan, the most recent of these is
considered to be the relevant report. If there is no such appraisal, or if the appraisal
is outdated, a local expert is assigned by BAG to prepare the appraisal report
(BAG). In conclusion, there is only one relevant report on the market value. Its
source is shown using three binary variables (BANK, COURT and BAG) that take
on the value of 1 if the report stems from the respective source. As to the authors of
the appraisal reports, it becomes obvious that the reports prepared by BAG show a
significantly higher proceeds ratio (86 %) than the reports for the comparable
groups. While there is no difference for the proceeds ratio derived from appraisal
reports prepared by the originating banks (77 %), the average proceeds ratio for
sales on the basis of judicial reports is only 57 %, which is significantly lower. One
possible explanation for this might be that, in comparison to judicial reports, BAG
and originating banks have to bear the consequences themselves if their estimate is
wrong, and therefore make a more conservative estimate.
Looking back at the legal definition for the determination of the (expected)
market value (§194, BauGB), it becomes obvious that a property’s condition as well
as its location have to be considered. To include the property’s condition, we
analyzed, based on the appraisal reports, the backlog of repairs and put this in
relation to the market value of a property in perfect condition (backlog of repair
ratio). If the ratio lies between 0 and 25 %, we assume a normal condition. The
binary variable ConditionNORMAL then takes a value of 1. A ratio above 25 % is
displayed with the binary variable ConditionBAD. In 40 % of the cases, we were not
able to identify the condition explicitly from the information provided by the data
set. Not including these cases would lead to the loss of a large proportion of the
observations. For that reason, the binary variable ConditionWITHOUT represents
properties with unknown condition.22 As to Condition, it can be demonstrated that
real estate in worse condition has a significantly lower proceeds ratio (67 %) than
the comparable group (81 %), although the condition as well as the location should
have already been considered by the experts. The fact that property in a bad
condition only attracts a very limited range of prospective buyers could offer one
21 For example, at the time of the study by Schaaff (2009), BAG mostly took over loans from
banks that were subject to restructuring.
22 We excluded in a robustness test (not reported) all properties with unknown condition from our
analyses. All results stay qualitatively the same.
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explanation. The very limited range of potential buyers, as well as the demand of the
buyers for a risk discount if they fear additional, as yet undiscovered, defects, could
explain the negative influence of the variable Condition. There is no significant
difference in the proceeds ratio for property in unknown condition (79 %) and a
comparable group consisting of properties in good and bad condition (77 %), which
may indicate that the group with unknown condition is in fact a mixture of
properties in good and bad condition and does not yield a selection bias.
The location is the second factor that is explicitly mentioned for determining a
property’s market value. The attractiveness of a location has to be measured on a
very fine regional scale. In cities with a high population density, the attractiveness
of the location varies greatly between the various neighborhoods (e.g., for the
wealthy area of Duesseldorf). When measuring particular neighborhoods, the
attractiveness of a location should be expressed by an aggregate ratio that expresses
as many advantages and disadvantages (e.g., transport links, nuisance, etc.) as
possible at the same time.
To fulfill these requirements, we make use of data provided by F?B GmbH. F?B
GmbH identifies an objective average selling price per square meter for different
types of property (single-family home, condominium, apartment house, commercial
property) on the postal code level for Germany.23 Since we cannot compare the
absolute average purchase prices of the different types of property, we construct an
index for each type of property. To do so, we first form the average purchase prices
for all postal codes on an annual basis. After this, we reference the given value for
the corresponding postal code to the previously determined average. Thereby, we
provide an index value for the relative attractiveness of a location. An index value
above 1 indicates prices above the German average for a certain property type in a
specific postal code area. We capture the index value for every property i with the
metric variable LOCATION. The year in which the workout-process started is
considered to be the relevant year, to display the expert’s knowledge optimally.
The index value for the variable location is on average 0.94, and indicates that the
attractiveness of the location of the properties included in the data is slightly below
the national German average. At the same time the maximum value (2.82) and the
minimum value (0.40) indicate strong differences in terms of attractiveness.
Moreover, a statistically significant, positive relation between a property’s location
and the proceeds ratio can be demonstrated (see Table 13 in the Appendix).
Although the location should have been considered in the experts’ appraisal reports,
there still seems to be a significant influence on the proceeds ratio at least in the
bivariate context. This contradicts Hypothesis H4.
The four previously mentioned types of property are displayed with the binary
variables SFH (single-family house), CONDO (condominium), APH (apartment)
and COMPROP (commercial property). The results show no significant difference
in the proceeds ratios for the different types of property.
23 F?B GmbH quarterly evaluates all purchase offers in Germany for single-family houses,
apartments, condominiums, and commercial properties based on the purchase offers on 100
websites on real estate. These offers are then validated by the realized purchase prices. The final
data include the average realized market price on a postal code level for the different types of
property (F?B GmbH 2013).
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Furthermore, we control for the type of workout-process. If there is an amicable
agreement between BAG and the debtor, all collateral from the debtor is released. If
there is no amicable agreement, the collateral is liquidated. First, collateral in real
estate is offered by a regional real estate agent mandated by BAG. If a buyer can be
found, the property is sold in an over-the-counter trade OTC. If the debtor is not
willing to cooperate or another creditor denies his consent and an over-the-counter
trade is not possible, BAG initiates a foreclosure auction. The disposal of the
property in a foreclosure auction is displayed with the binary variable FO. At 92 %,
the proceeds ratio for over-the-counter trades is significantly higher than the
proceeds ratio for foreclosure auctions (71 %).
Additionally, we control for changes in the real gross domestic product (GDP)
and the unemployment rate (UER) at the time of the transferal to BAG.
4.3 Multivariate analysis
In the multivariate analysis, the proceeds ratio (PRi) of property i serves as the
dependent variable. The base categories are the appraisal reports issued by BAG
(BAG), commercial property (COMPROP), property with unknown condition
(ConditionWITHOUT) as well as over-the-counter trades (OTC). The complete model
is as follows.
PRi;t ¼ b0 þ b1  BANKi þ b2  COURTi þ b3 MVLNi þ b4  ConditionNORMALi
þ b5  ConditionBADi þ b6  LOCATIONi þ b7  APHi þ b8  CONDOi
þ b9  SFHi þ b10  FOi þ b11  GDPt þ b12  UERt þ i:
ð6Þ
In contrast to the recovery rate, the proceeds ratio is not limited to the interval [0,1].
However, the proceeds ratio only takes positive values. Hence, we employ a Tobit
model using robust standard errors that was proposed by Tobin (1958) and is
designed for the case of a non-negative-dependent variable.
The estimation results can be found in Table 7, where we display the average
marginal effects at the means of the covariates of the Tobit regression. The results
from the bivariate analysis for the authors of the appraisal reports can be confirmed:
appraisal reports prepared by the loan issuing bank or the court are associated with a
significantly lower proceeds ratio than reports by BAG.24 As mentioned before, a
possible explanation for this finding could be the fact that in comparison to reports
prepared by the court, BAG and the originating banks have to bear the consequences
themselves if their estimate is wrong, and therefore make more conservative
24 Because of potential differences in the effects of the independent variables depending on the
authors of the appraisal reports, which might not be obvious in a bivariate analysis, we performed,
by analogy to the customer groups, a sample split as a robustness test. In other words, the overall
sample was split into three subsamples. There was no change in the essential results, especially
regarding the property’s location and condition. In particular, keeping in mind future analyses and
also for the sake of clarity, we consider it more reasonable to display the authors of the appraisal
reports with binary variables.
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estimates; the estimates of BAG seem to be even more conservative than the
estimates of the originating banks.
Interestingly, our results still indicate that properties with high values, as
measured by taking the market value’s logarithm, are linked to significantly lower
proceeds ratios. This is consistent with the results of Grunert (2010).25 This result
seems especially reasonable for real estate, bearing in mind that with an increasing
market value, the number of potential buyers decreases.
Regarding the property’s condition, properties in bad condition show a
significantly lower proceeds ratio. See Sect. 4.2 for a discussion of this finding in
the bivariate context. Our results are in line with the educated guess by Schaaff
(2009), who was not able to analyze the influence of condition in more detail
because of missing data.
Besides a property’s condition, its location also has a significant influence on the
proceeds ratio, as already demonstrated in the bivariate analysis. Objects located in
an area that is attractive according to the index show a significantly higher proceeds
ratio. In this way, our results indicate that the measurement of the attractiveness of a
location on a very fine regional scale and a distinction between the types of
properties are important features when controlling for a property’s location. Our
approach is more precise in catching regional particularities and object specifics,




















***, **, * indicates a 1, 5 and 10 % confidence level. The robust standard errors are given in brackets
25 We have to point out that the analysis by Grunert (2010) is not only based on collateral in real
estate. Furthermore, in his study, a piece of collateral is assumed to be ‘small’ if its value is less
than EUR 660,000.
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and is in contrast to the studies by, for example, Qi and Yang (2009) and Leow and
Mues (2012) who use broader house price indices in the context of recovery rate
literature. A study explicitly analyzing the proceeds ratio using an index controlling
for location has not yet been performed.
When analyzing the properties’ market values, it was mentioned that the negative
influence of the logarithmized market value on the proceeds ratio could be caused
by the limited class of potential buyers since an increasing market value is often
linked to an increasing specificity. On the contrary, the property type ‘condo-
minium’ is linked to a significantly lower proceeds ratio in comparison to
commercial properties. In comparison to other types of properties, especially
commercial properties, this type of property is characterized by a very low
specificity. However, realizing more than one condominium of a single debtor
usually results in a package price that is lower than the sum of the individual prices.
This could offer an explanation for the negative influence.
Reviewing the control variables, a highly significant influence of the workout-
process can be demonstrated. In the multivariate context, the proceeds ratio for
property sold through foreclosures is significantly lower than the proceeds ratio
achieved by over-the-counter sales. Nevertheless, it remains questionable whether
the workout-process can really be considered to be an influencing factor or whether
the workout-process is only a result of the various characteristics of the property. In
conclusion, the influence of the workout-process could also be caused by the fact
that many characteristics, such as the year of construction, cannot be analyzed but
are partly captured by the type of workout-process.
There are some empirical analyses from the US discussing a possible discount for
foreclosure auctions (e.g., Shilling et al. 1990; Carroll et al. 1997; Clauretie and
Daneshvary 2009). These studies usually try to explain the selling price or the
premium instead of the proceeds ratio, using hedonistic regressions. Nevertheless,
there are certain similarities with regard to the content of these studies. Shilling
et al. (1990) identify a significant discount of up to 24 %, and Carroll et al. (1997) a
discount between 12 and 14 %, for foreclosure auctions in comparison to over-the-
counter trades. More recent studies, which are testing for more discriminating
factors, assume that the differences are determined by the property’s characteristics
instead of the type of workout-process. The discount for foreclosure auctions equals
only 10 % in the study by Clauretie and Daneshvary (2009) and 3–7 % in the study
by Campbell et al. (2011).
We find significant influences of our macroeconomic control variables on the
proceeds ratio. There is a significantly positive relation between the unemployment
rate (UER) and the proceeds ratio, and a negative relation between real GDP growth
and the proceeds ratio.26 The direction of the macroeconomic influences is
surprising at first glance. But the results regarding the unemployment rate (UER) are
consistent with the results published by Schaaff (2009) and partially so with those
26 Again, to overcome the concern that our macroeconomic variables do not pick up all
macroeconomic effects, we perform a robustness test using year dummies for the respective default
year (see Table 15 in the Appendix). All our results stay qualitatively the same. Therefore, we
consider our macroeconomic variables to be suitable on the collateral level as well.
Business Research (2016) 9:179–228 207
123
published by Grunert (2010), both for German data sets. The negative influence of
real GDP growth on the proceeds ratio could be caused by the observation period
that includes the financial crisis. To cross-check the consistency of our findings, we
calculated the correlation of the percentage change of the house price index reported
by the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt) in comparison to
the preceding year, as well as the percentage change of the residential property
index (likewise reported by the German Federal Statistical Office) with the annual
real GDP growth for the period 2005 through 2011. We find for both indices a
negative, though not significant, correlation with real GDP growth, which supports
our findings. Schaaff (2009) and Grunert (2010) find no significant influence of GDP
growth on the proceeds ratio. Likely this variable sometimes picks up artifacts.
In conclusion, we are able to identify various factors that have a significant
relationship with the proceeds ratio. However, considering the point in time, we
have to differentiate between two kinds of factors: there are factors already known
at the time when the appraisal report is prepared, such as the condition and the
location, and there are control variables which we only get to know after the
workout-process is completed, such as the type of liquidation. Since the factors that
are known at the time of preparing the appraisal report significantly influence the
proceeds ratio even when we control for other variables, there is an indication of a
systematic bias in appraisal reports. Therefore, Hypothesis H4 has to be rejected.
However, the question arises as to how this may affect the explanation of the
recovery rate. To give an answer, in the following section (Sect. 5.1) we will
develop a prediction model based on our results to identify an individual correction
factor di for each individual property i. This equals the predicted proceeds ratio P^Ri.
Multiplying this factor by the market value results in the adjusted market value and,
therefore, in a new adjusted collateralization ratio (Sect. 5.2). In consequence, we
are able to analyze the influence of the adjustment at the borrower level (Sect. 5.3).
5 Influence of the adjusted market values on the recovery rate
5.1 Prediction model
In the context of our prediction model, we have to differentiate between two groups
of properties: one group is for calibrating the model (groupCAL), and the other group
is for predicting the proceeds ratio (groupPRED). If the observations for the two
groups are identical, it is a mere in-sample analysis, whereas we have an out-of-
sample analysis if there is a difference between groupCAL and groupPRED. In the
following, we will describe the composition of both groups in more detail.
For the context of our analysis, groupPRED always consists of all 711 properties
assigned to the 499 debtors for whom the workout-process was completed (see
Fig. 6). To calibrate the model, we use three differently compounded groups.
groupCALA consists of the 718 properties that were analyzed in the previous
section. groupCALB consists of the 324 properties for which the workout-process on
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the borrower level was completed, while groupCALC is made up of the 394 properties
with incomplete workout-processes on the borrower level.
Therefore, we have a (partial) out-of-sample analysis for the subsequent
observation at the borrower level for all three calibrating groups because the
calibrating group and the estimation group always differ. The strongest out-of-
sample test is that for groupCALC because there is no overlap between the analyzed
borrowers and the collateral used for calibration.
In the context of the calibration of the three prediction models, we use the
proceeds ratio (PRi) of property i as the value to be explained and the factors known
at the time of creating the appraisal report as the explanatory variables (i.e., we
exclude FO, GDP and UER). The explanatory variables are the author of the
appraisal reports, the condition and the type of the property and its location, and the
(expected) market value of the property. The base categories are the binary variables
BAG, ConditionWITHOUT, and COMPROP. The complete model is the following.
PRi ¼ b0 þ b1  BANKi þ b2  COURTi þ b3 MVLNi þ b4  ConditionNORMALi
þ b5  ConditionBADi þ b6  LOCATIONi þ b7  APHi þ b8  CONDOi
þ b9  SFHi þ i: ð7Þ
The Tobit model using robust standard errors is once more applied for the esti-
mation. Since not all the included variables are of statistical significance, but are
Fig. 6 Borrower and collateral
levels
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correlated with the remaining factors of influence and could, therefore, influence the
quality of the estimation, we use a backward elimination for the estimation
models.27
The average marginal effects at the means of the Tobit regression are displayed
in Table 8 for the three calibration groups. On the one hand, it becomes obvious that
the majority of the variables for all three models (e.g., ConditionBAD, Location)
have statistical significance. On the other hand, there are considerable differences
between other variables depending on the model. For example, the preparation of
the appraisal report by the bank is not included in Model (5) due to its lack of
statistical significance. Because of these differences, it seems interesting to analyze
how adjusting the market value influences the recovery rate.
5.2 Adjusting the market values
In the next step, as previously explained, we use the three calibrated estimation
models (A, B and C) to estimate individual correction factors di;k with k 2
(A, B, C) for all 711 properties. We analyze whether and how the result on the
collateral level influences the recovery rate, i.e., the borrower level. Thus, we
Table 8 Tobit regression with proceeds ratio as dependent variable










BANK -0.1042*** (0.0327) -0.1680*** (0.0437)
COURT -0.2749*** (0.0280) -0.2455*** (0.0347) -0.2666*** (0.0404)
MVLN -0.0398** (0.0170) -0.0560* (0.0294)
ConditionNORMAL
ConditionBAD -0.1416*** (0.0285) -0.1647*** (0.0406) -0.1138*** (0.0419)
Location 0.2562*** (0.0417) 0.3103*** (0.0723) 0.1453*** (0.0432)
APH -0.1001** (0.0464)
CONDO -0.0986*** (0.0326) -0.1048** (0.0505) -0.0807** (0.0372)
SFH
Constant 1.1347*** (0.1997) 1.2458*** (0.3351) 0.7881*** (0.0523)
Observations 718 324 394
Pseudo R2 0.2135 0.2877 0.1900
In Model (4), (5), and (6), the estimation of the coefficients is based on groupCALA , group
CAL
B , and
groupCALC , respectively. ***, **, * indicates a 1, 5 and 10 % confidence level. The robust standard errors
are given in brackets
27 A partial F-test, testing how the coefficient of determination differs when a variable is excluded,
given that the variable is not statistically significant, is the basis for excluding variables from the
model. We ran the regressions without a backward elimination as well. Their results show nearly
the same coefficients and significance level as our reported values for the backward elimination.
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employ the individual correction parameters to determine the adjusted collateral-
ization value for real estate. Equation (2) changes to
CVreal estatei;k ¼ MAXðMINðdi;k MVi  PLi;LCiÞ; 0Þ: ð8Þ
Therefore, the adjusted collateralization ratio for every debtor j and the calibration












Next, we form the corresponding collateralization ratios for all 499 debtors whose
workout-processes were completed, and get three adjusted collateralization ratios
CRA, CRB and CRC, derived from the different calibration groups k. Again, we limit
the collateralization ratio to the interval [0,1]. In German banking practice the
correction of collateral values is not uncommon. But in contrast to our approach,
which adjusts the collateral value depending on the associated attributes of the
collateral, banking practice commonly applies a flat haircut to the collateral value.
For collateral in real estate in Germany this haircut ranges between 10 and 40 %
(e.g., Grunert and Weber 2009; Bruhn 2009; Pfnu¨r 2011). Unlike this flat discount,
our individual correction parameter can also take on values above 1 and, therefore,
cause discounts and premiums. In the following, we compare our model-adjusted
collateralization ratios with two flat haircuts of 20 % (CR80) and 30 % (CR70) as
well as with our original results using the original collateralization ratio. Table 9
shows descriptive statistics for the original and the resulting adjusted collateral-
ization ratios. Figure 7 illustrates the corresponding frequency distributions. The
average original collateralization ratio drops in all three model-adjusted cases from
66 to 55 %. The collateralization ratio drops in the case of a 30 % flat haircut to as
little as 50 % on average, whereas the resulting average of 56 % in the case of a
20 % haircut is highly comparable to the model-adjusted cases. If the sample is split
between retail and commercial customers, the main results stay about the same. As
discussed earlier, the collateralization ratios are considerably lower for commercial
customers than for retail customers.
Table 9 Descriptive statistics of adjusted collateralization ratios
Variable Full sample Retail customers Commercial customers
Mean Median r N Mean Median r N Mean Median r N
CR 0.66 0.73 0.32 499 0.70 0.77 0.31 368 0.58 0.59 0.34 131
CRA 0.55 0.55 0.33 499 0.57 0.59 0.33 368 0.48 0.46 0.34 131
CRB 0.55 0.55 0.33 499 0.57 0.60 0.33 368 0.49 0.46 0.34 131
CRC 0.55 0.55 0.33 499 0.57 0.57 0.33 368 0.49 0.47 0.34 131
CR70 0.50 0.47 0.32 499 0.52 0.50 0.31 368 0.43 0.40 0.32 131
CR80 0.56 0.56 0.32 499 0.59 0.60 0.31 368 0.48 0.47 0.34 131
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5.3 Regression results
Using the Fractional Logit Model to explain the recovery rate at the borrower level,
with robust standard errors that are clustered for the originating bank, leads to the
results displayed in Table 11. Model (2) repeats the results of the regressions of the
unadjusted collateralization ratio for retail customers [Model (2a)] and commercial
customers [Model (2b)] already discussed in detail in Sect. 2.4. Models (7)–(11)
show the adjusted collateralization ratios (CRA, CRB, CRC, CR70 and CR80)
resulting from the different calibration groups as well as the flat haircuts explained
in the previous section.
The results show that considering adjustments results in a significant improve-
ment of the model’s explanatory power. The value for the adjusted R2 of Models
(7)–(11) is higher than that of Model (2). For both the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), lower values mean higher
Fig. 7 Frequency distributions of adjusted collateralization ratios
Table 10 Degrees of preference according to Raftery (1995)




[ 10 Very strong
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explanatory power, therefore, confirming the necessity of an adjusted collateraliza-
tion ratio for a precise estimate of the recovery rate.
Another advantage of using the BIC to discriminate between models is the
possibility of evaluating the strength of preference for one model over another.
According to Raftery (1995), there are four categories oriented to the absolute
difference between two BIC values (see Table 10). In comparison to Model [2a(b)],
Models [7a(b)] to [9a(b)] result in absolute differences significantly above 10(6)
and, therefore, show a very strong (strong) preference for explanatory models using
the adjusted collateralization ratio. Interestingly, this result is very robust as it is
valid for all three calibration groups, and the maximum difference of the BIC over
Models (7) to (9) is 3.67, which is, according to Table 10, a positive though neither
strong nor even very strong preference for Model (7a) over Model (9a). The inferior
values are reasonable because in Model (9a) there is no relation between the
analyzed debtors and the collateral used for calibration (strongest out-of-sample
test). However, we are able to conclude that employing the correction parameters
significantly improves the explanatory power, and this result can be confirmed for
all three calibration groups.
For the haircut models (10) to (11), we find a positive preference [for Model (10a)
even a strong preference] in comparison to the unadjustedmodels (2). If we compare the
correction parametermodels (7) to (9) with the flat haircutmodels (10) to (11), we find a
very strong preference for retail customers and a positive preference for commercial
customers for Models (7) to (9). The considerably higher adjusted R2 confirms this
argument. Therefore, we can conclude that our models that use the correction
parameters outperform the unadjusted models and the flat haircut models.
So far, we have discussed the explanatory power of the various models. Now we
are going to analyze the significant changes in the influence of the different
variables when employing the adjusted collateralization ratios. While the standard-
ized coefficients of the collateralization ratio increase for Models (7) to (11), the
coefficients for redemption decrease for Models (7) to (9) and increase for Models
(10) to (11). Apparently, a part of the distorted illustration of collateral was captured
in the redemption variable.
Furthermore, we are able to demonstrate that some of the control variables
(EADLN and INS) for retail customers lose their previous significance, whereas
there is no change for commercial customers. The results for the macroeconomic
factors stay qualitatively the same for all models.28
6 Conclusions
Previously, academic research as well as banking practice have focused on models
and methods to estimate the probability of default (PD). Well-founded results for
the recovery rate are still rare, although their number has increased in recent years.
28 Again, we use in a robustness test year dummies for the respective default year (see Table 14 in
the Appendix). All our results stay qualitatively the same. Therefore, we consider our
macroeconomic variable setup to be suitable.
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Banks seeking the transition to advanced IRB approaches have to demonstrate that
they have the appropriate internal models to estimate the recovery rate. To keep the
effort of collecting and processing data as small as possible, results from academic
studies could provide essential insights for identifying the important factors
influencing the recovery rate. However, the greater part of the empirical research is
based on US and UK banking data. These results cannot be, or can only to a limited
extent, transferred to Germany because of differences in the collateral and in the
legal systems.
This article provides empirical evidence for the drivers of the recovery rate for
retail and commercial customers in Germany, based on a data set of 909 defaulting
customers from exactly this market segment whose original loans were with 123
different banks. We are able to confirm a positive relationship between the
collateralization ratio as well as the type of workout-process and the recovery rate.
Furthermore, we demonstrate the important role of redemption in the processing of
problematic loans, because an amicable agreement with an already defaulting
customer was achieved in 40 % of the cases. As to the two customer groups (retail
and commercial), it becomes obvious that a separate analysis is necessary, because
there are diametrically opposite effects for some of the control variables (e.g., the
EAD). In total, our model is able to explain 63 and 67 %, respectively, of the
variance of the customers’ recovery rates measured with the adjusted R2, although it
seems likely that this result is merely based on the collateral in real estate.
Because of the major influence of collateral based on real estate, we analyzed the
valuation of the properties included in the data set in more detail. The proceeds
ratio, that is, the relation between the realized market price and the expected market
value, is only 78 % on average. This result is surprising because the valuation in the
form of the (expected) market value should already have included all the factors
influencing the value. A multivariate analysis of the proceeds ratio shows that,
among others, the condition of the property is not considered appropriately in the
value derived from the appraisal reports. The same is the case for the attractiveness
of the property’s location. To approximate a location’s attractiveness, we were able
to use a postal code-based index depending on the property type. Subsequently, we
developed a prediction model for the proceeds ratio to eliminate the identified
systematic bias in the market value. In this way, the present article goes beyond
previous studies.
In a next step, we use the predicted proceeds ratio to adjust the market value of
real estate. We thereby obtain an adjusted collateralization ratio and then create
additional adjusted collateralization ratios by applying, in accordance with common
banking practice, flat haircuts of 20 and 30 % to the collateral in real estate. The
new analysis of the recovery rate provides several new insights. First, the models’
explanatory power can be increased by adjusting by the recognized biases and using
the adjusted collateralization ratio. This is confirmed by a (partially) out-of-sample
test. Therefore, we can conclude that our models that use the correction parameter
outperform the unadjusted models and the flat haircut models. Second, some of the
control variables for retail customers lose their previously significant influence. The
combined analysis at the borrower and collateral levels should, therefore, be a
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crucial part of the analysis of factors influencing the recovery rate in future
empirical studies.
Our results make an important contribution to further academic research. On the
one hand, the analysis should be applied separately for every customer group
because single variables could function in diametrically opposite ways. On the other
hand, factors influencing the recovery rate that were identified in other studies (in
particular for retail customers), could be caused by the biased valuation of the
collateral. Future studies should, therefore, not consider the value of the collateral as
a given. Additionally, the banks should review their current practice of flat haircuts
and should instead apply adjustments of the collateral value depending on the
associated attributes of the collateral as presented in our study. Moreover, the final
model is able to explain a large fraction of the recovery rate’s variance (adjusted R2
equals approximately 70–77 %) and is able to identify the collateralization ratio as
the essential driver of the recovery rate. Therefore, the banking practice should
concentrate on the collateralization ratio and its unbiased form. To allow a
systematic analysis of the collateralization ratio, the collection and processing of
data should focus on the creation of databases for real estate collateral upon which
there have been defaults.
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International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
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Appendix
See Tables 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17.
Table 12 Correlation matrix for the variables on the borrower level
Variable EADLN CR COL RED BT WOP INS GDP UER RR
EADLN 1.00
CR -0.20* 1.00
COL 0.31* -0.09 1.00
RED -0.03 0.31* 0.06 1.00
BT 0.35* -0.16* 0.36* -0.01 1.00
WOP 0.18* 0.04 0.10* -0.10* 0.10* 1.00
INS 0.05 -0.12* 0.03 -0.27* 0.06 0.14* 1.00
GDP -0.01 -0.09 -0.05 -0.18* 0.03 0.17* 0.09 1.00
UER -0.13* -0.08 0.08 0.07 0.09* 0.35* -0.14* -0.24* 1.00
RR -0.07 0.70* 0.03 0.55* -0.02 0.01 -0.23* -0.17* 0.16* 1.00
* indicates a 5 % confidence level
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Default year 2006 -0.0719 (0.080)
Default year 2007 -0.1206*** (0.039)
Default year 2008 -0.1338*** (0.047)
Default year 2009 0.0019 (0.069)




***, **, * indicates a 1, 5 and 10 % confidence level. The robust standard errors are given in brackets





Model (12a) Model (12b)
H1
CR 0.4621*** (0.26) 0.5148*** (0.421)
H2
COL 0.0408 (0.044) 0.0349 (0.035)
Control variables
RED 0.217*** (0.135) 0.1908*** (0.233)
EADLN 0.1535*** (0.072) -0.1157* (0.113)
WOP 0.0314 (0.005) 0.024 (0.009)
INS -0.0472 (0.169) -0.0006 (0.169)
GDP -0.0169 (0.04) 0.0273 (0.037)
UER 0.0352 (0.071) 0.0906 (0.096)






Model (12a) Model (12b)




Mc Fadden R2 0.1841 0.2002
R2 0.5035 0.6042
Adj. R2 0.4879 0.5690
Wald test (p-value) 322.32 (0.000) 209.62 (0.000)
***, **, * Indicates a 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level. The robust standard errors that are clustered for
the originating bank are given in brackets





Model (13a) Model (13b) Model (14a) Model (14b)
H1






COL 0.0205 (0.048) 0.0883 (0.051) 0.1267 (0.095) 0.0686 (0.046)
Control variables
EADLN 0.1561*** (0.090) -0.0536 (0.138) -0.0757 (0.107) -0.2507**
(0.192)
WOP 0.0010 (0.008) 0.0673 (0.016) -0.1085 (0.012) -0.0342 (0.014)
INS -0.0781 (0.206) 0.0164 (0.263) -0.0990* (0.685) -0.1206**
(0.332)
GDP -0.0041 (0.049) -0.0401 (0.104) -0.0491 (0.061) 0.0066 (0.084)
UER 0.0592 (0.071) -0.0215 (0.184) 0.0893 (0.103) 0.3003*** (0.127)
Constant -6.6852***
(1.338)
-1.173 (2.247) -0.8574 (1.247) 0.7023 (2.956)
Observations 223 81 145 50
AIC 0.9650 0.9786 0.6009 0.9665
BIC -1089.97 -300.99 -652.40 -154.60
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